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REFUSAL TO UNDERGO A CESAREAN
SECTION: A WOMAN'S RIGHT OR A
CRIMINAL ACT?
Monica K. Millert
INTRODUCTION
In March, 2004, Melissa Ann Rowland, a twenty-eight-year-old
woman from Salt Lake City, gained national media attention when she
was arrested on charges of homicide relating to the death of her son.
Although there are many child homicide cases that occur regularly
across the country that do not attract wide-spread media attention, this
case was exceptional because her son died before he was ever born. 1
Rowland had sought medical treatment several times between late
December 2003 and January 9, 2004. Each time, she was allegedly
advised to get immediate medical treatment, including a cesarean sec-
tion (c-section), because her twin fetuses were in danger of death or
serious injury. On January 2, 2004, she purportedly signed a docu-
ment acknowledging that she was aware that her refusal of treatment
might endanger, or result in the death of, her babies. She then left the
hospital without treatment, choosing instead to wait until she went
into labor naturally on January 13, 2004.
The female twin survived, while the boy was stillborn. An au-
topsy indicated that the boy had died two days before the birth. Thus,
the child was still alive at the time doctors advised her to undergo the
c-section. Rowland was arrested and charged with first-degree crimi-
t Monica K. Miller is Assistant Professor for the Criminal Justice Depart-
ment and Interdisciplinary Social Psychology Ph.D. Program at the University of
Nevada, Reno. She earned her J.D. from the University of Nebraska College of Law
in 2002 and her Ph.D. from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 2004.
1 See generally Murder Charged in Stillbirth, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004,
available at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20040314-121449-3356r.htm (last
visited Apr. 28, 2005); Alexandria Sage, Utah Woman Charged with Murder in Death
of Fetus, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.freep.com/news/latestnews/pm18858_20040312.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2005) (detailing the facts surrounding the Rowland case); Jacob Santini, Charge
Against W. Jordan Mother Creates Legal Challenge, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 12,
2004, at A4.
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nal homicide and child endangerment. She later pled guilty to two
counts of child endangerment and the homicide charge was dropped.2
This case represents the first reported case of a prosecution of a
mother for her refusal to have a c-section. This is an interesting
precedent that raises several legal questions. Does a woman have the
right to refuse treatment that will benefit, or even save the life of, her
fetus? Can a woman be prosecuted for her behaviors during preg-
nancy? Will prosecuting the refusal of a c-section create a slippery
slope of charges against mothers for their behavior during pregnancy?
Section I of this paper will begin by discussing a series of cases in
which the state sought to compel a woman to have a c-section against
her wishes. It will then discuss the rights of all the parties involved in
such cases: the mother, the state, and the fetus. Section II will present
the evolution of fetal rights from common law to the current prosecu-
tion of Melissa Rowland. Section III presents an analysis that answers
two questions: (1) Under the current case law, will states be successful
in prosecuting a woman for the failure to have a c-section?; and (2)
Should the state prosecute women for failure to have a c-section?
This paper concludes that courts and prosecutors should not
criminalize the failure to have a c-section. A woman's fundamental
right to privacy and the right to refuse medical treatment should be
honored, since individuals are not required to come to the aid of oth-
ers. Women should not be treated as criminals for their choice to ex-
ercise their rights to refuse treatment instead of taking a doctor's ad-
vice, which may or may not be accurate. Making it a crime to refuse a
c-section jeopardizes a woman's rights and subjects her to an in-
creased risk of injury as a result of a surgery that may have been un-
necessary.
I. COMPELLED CESAREAN SECTIONS
The case of Melissa Rowland illustrates the state of Utah's will-
ingness to intervene with a woman's choices concerning pregnancy, a
trend that is spreading throughout many states.3 Ultimately, Utah is
2 Alexandria Sage, Mother Pleads Guilty to Lesser Counts of Child Endan-
germent, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 7, 2004, available at http://desertnews.com/
dn/print/1,1442,595054420,00.html (last visited May 2, 2005).
3 See e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (debat-
ing whether a mother's competent choice to refuse a c-section during pregnancy was
to be notable); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga.
1981) (per curiam) (holding that the state's interest in the unborn child justified the
intrusion into the lives of the unborn child's parents); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235
(D.C. 1990); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247
(N.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that in the case of a forced c-section, the scope of a plain-
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sending a message to women: Follow your doctor's orders, or you
will be held criminally responsible. The woman's wishes are irrele-
vant; if she refuses the c-section, she can be prosecuted for homicide
or child endangerment.
On one hand, the choice of whether to obtain medical treatment
that would possibly save the life of the unborn child seems like an
easy choice. Most women would unquestionably take their doctor's
advice and do whatever was necessary to protect their fetus. On the
other hand, there are a variety of reasons why women would refuse
treatment.4 For instance, a woman may be concerned for her health as
a result of the c-section. A c-section is major surgery that brings with
it the possibility of complications, some of which could be long last-
ing.5 Some women may refuse for religious reasons6 or because they
do not trust the doctor's advice. No matter the reason for refusal,
these women are exercising their right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment. The question remains, however, as to whether this right is
absolute. Can the state compel a woman to undergo surgery against
her wishes?
As with most controversial issues, the courts are divided on the
answer to this question. While the Rowland case is the first reported
case in which a woman has been prosecuted for refusing to have a c-
section, other women have been compelled by the courts to have c-
sections to protect their fetuses.7 Thus, the decisions issued in such
tiffs personal constitutional rights do not outweigh the interests of the state in pre-
serving the life of the unborn child); In re Ruiz 500 N.E.2d 935 (Wood County C.P.
1986) (holding that a mother's heroin use prior to the birth of her fetus constituted
child abuse); State v Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997) (holding that an expectant
mother cannot be criminally charged for the death of her "born alive" child as a result
of self-inflicted injuries during the third trimester of her pregnancy); Johnson v. State,
602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (considering whether a Florida statute prohibiting the
delivery of a controlled substance to a minor should apply to a woman who used
drugs while pregnant); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (construing a
state child abuse statute to include a mother's action against her viable fetus); In re
Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that a presumption arose
that a child was in need of juvenile court protection when its mother caused it to be
born with a detrimental condition by ingesting dangerous drugs).
4 According to nurses, Rowland allegedly refused the c-section because she
did not want the scar that accompanies the surgery. Rowland has disputed that claim.
Rowland has disputed that claim. Alexandria Sage, Mother Agrees to Guilty Plea in
Fatal Delay of C-Section, CHI. SUN TiMEs, Apr. 8, 2004, at 28.
5 See generally Pamala Harris, Compelled Medical Treatments of Pregnant
Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133
(2001) (stating risks of c-sections).
6 See e.g., Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458; In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at
327; Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
7 E.g., Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457; Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1248-49.
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cases are relevant as to whether the state can use its criminal laws to
essentially force a woman to have a c-section. Some courts have held
that the decision of whether or not to have a c-section is a woman's
choice that must be honored. 8 Other courts have determined that this
right is limited and must be balanced against the rights of the state
and/or the fetus.9 States have even come to different conclusions as to
the outcome of the balancing test. Several cases have indicated that
the woman's rights are subordinate,' while another found that the
rights of the mother prevailed. 1
A. The Woman's Absolute Right to Refuse
Perhaps the ruling that most strongly favors mothers' rights is In
re Baby Boy Doe,'2 a case in which a mother refused to have a c-
section for religious reasons. The court ultimately ruled that a
woman's refusal of an invasive procedure such as a c-section must
prevail, even if it results in harm to the fetus. The court did not bal-
ance the woman's rights against the state's interests or the fetus's
rights. Instead, it indicated that the woman had an absolute right to
refuse treatment and no balancing of interests was needed.
13
B. The Balancing of Rights
Other courts have indicated that a balancing test is necessary in
order to determine whether the mother can refuse a c-section.' 4 This
idea of balancing rights comes from a line of abortion cases, which
have determined that the state's interests must be weighed against
woman's right to privacy. 5 In the case of Jefferson v. Griffin Spal-
8 E.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 326.
9 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460; In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237-38 (D.C.
1990) (explaining that a trial court should try to determine the wishes of an incompe-
tent patient who has a viable fetus when making medical decisions).
10 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460; Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (holding
that forcing a mother to undergo a c-section does not violate her constitutional rights).
" In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1237.
12 632 N.E.2d 326.
13 id.
14 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 260; In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1251.
15 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (balancing mother's interests with
the state's); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992) (espousing undue
burden standard as a test for abortion restrictions); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (prohibiting the state from placing
onerous restrictions on abortions); Moses Cook, From Conception Until Birth: Ex-
ploring the Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307 (2002)
(discussing abortion cases and right to privacy).
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ding County Hospital,16 the court ordered a woman to have a c-section
even though the procedure was counter to her religious beliefs. The
court found that the fetus was a viable human being which was pro-
tected by the laws of the state and that the state had a "compelling"
interest in the fetus after viability.17 The court granted custody of the
child to the state and ultimately found that the fetus's right to life
outweighed the parents' wishes. 18
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia came to a differ-
ent conclusion after applying a balancing test. 19 The court determined
that the lower court had incorrectly found that the rights of the mother
were subordinate to those of the fetus. 20 The court also found that
individuals have a right to make informed treatment decisions, 2 ' and
in "virtually all cases the decision of the patient ... will control.
22
Finally, the court stated that only in extraordinary cases would the
state's interests outweigh those of the mother.23
The major rights and interests that are typically discussed in such
cases are the state's interest in protecting the fetus, the mother's rights
to privacy and bodily integrity, and fetus's right to be born healthy.
The next three sections will discuss these rights in more detail.
C. The Mother's Rights
Generally, when courts find in favor of the mother, their conclu-
sions are based on her constitutional rights.24 The strongest argument
a mother can make is that she has a right to refuse medical treatment.
This right is based on common law and the constitutional concepts of
an individual's right to bodily integrity, self-determination, and pri-25
vacy. The Constitution provides a competent individual the right to
refuse unwanted medical procedures.26 This concept is also imbedded
16 274 S.E.2d at 460.
17 Id. at 461 (Smith, J., concurring) (explaining that the state's interest in
preserving the life of the child outweighs the intrusion on the mother).
Id. at 460.
19 In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1237.
20 Id. at 1244.
21 Id. at 1247.
22 Id. at 1252.
23 id.
24 See generally Harris, supra note 5, at 143 (discussing judicial considera-
tions in compelled c-sections).
25 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1235 (D.C. 1990); Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing the legal importance of self-
determination).
26 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (discussing
individual constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and the Due
Process Fourteenth Amendment). See also Julie B. Murphy, Note, Competing Inter-
2005]
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in the notion of informed consent; physicians are prohibited from per-
forming medical procedures on a patient without consent, 7 and the
28failure to gain consent is considered battery.
Although this right to privacy is not relinquished when a woman
becomes pregnant, it is not absolute, and the state can intervene in
some circumstances. 29 Some courts have determined that the presence
of a fetus allows the state to intervene and compel a c-section.30 On
the other hand, the court in In re Baby Boy Doe applied the right of
privacy to a woman's refusal of a c-section and found that this right is
absolute.31
Another right that is often argued, but largely ignored by the
courts, is the woman's right to free exercise of religion. 32 Generally
speaking, the First Amendment provides the right to act according to
one's religious beliefs, although these rights can be regulated by the
state.33 For example, parents do not have an absolute right to refuse
medical treatment for their children, even when refusal is based on
religious grounds.34 In such cases, the state's compelling interest in
the health and welfare of its children outweigh the parents' rights.
Some women who have refused c-sections have done so on reli-
gious grounds. 35 Typically, the courts in these cases have barely ac-
knowledged the mother's religious interests. In Jefferson v. Griffin
Spalding, the court "weighed the right of the mother to practice her
religion and to refuse surgery on herself, against her unborn child's
right to live [and] found in favor of her child's right to live."36 Addi-
ests: When a Pregnant Woman Refuses to Consent to Medical Treatment Beneficial to
Her Fetus, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 189 (2001) (reviewing a pregnant woman's right to
refuse treatments).
27 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
28 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783.
29 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632
N.E.2d 326, 332 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that the woman's right to refuse is abso-
lute).
30 Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga.
1981); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251
(N.D. Fla. 1999).
31 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 332.
32 See generally April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant
Women Who Refuse Medical Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REv. 563 (2002) (examining the
intersection of a mother's freedom to exercise religion and the rights of an unborn
child).
33 See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); see also Cherry, supra
note 32.
34 See Prince v Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that the state
has a broad range of powers in limiting parental freedom).
35 E.g., Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458; Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
36 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
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tionally, the court determined that "the intrusion involved into the life
of [the parents] ... is outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a
living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death before be-
ing given the opportunity to live. 37
Similarly, the court in Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Re-
gional Medical Center ordered a woman to undergo a c-section, stat-
ing, "[w]hatever the scope of Ms. Pemberton's personal constitutional
rights in this situation, they clearly did not outweigh the interests of
the [s]tate...,38 Thus, the court ordered Pemberton to undergo the c-
section despite her religion-based objections. As these cases demon-
strate, the courts have not given the woman's religious rights substan-
tial weight in their balancing tests.
D. State's Interests
When the state claims an interest in the situation in which a
mother refuses a c-section, it often relies on the logic behind Roe v.
Wade and other abortion cases.39 Since the state has an "important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life, 40 states
have the authority to regulate abortions after the fetus has reached
viability.41 Planned Parenthood v. Casey expanded this ruling by
asserting that the state has an interest in protecting the fetus from con-
ception.42 When applied to the refusal of a c-section, the assumption
is made that, if the state's interest is strong enough to protect a viable
fetus from abortion, the state can compel medical treatment against
the mother's wishes. The Casey court stated, "[i]n some broad sense
it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has con-
sented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child.A
3
This suggests that a woman's rights are subordinated when she be-
comes pregnant, allowing the state to intervene.
While the Supreme Court in Roe and Casey seemingly gave the
lower courts the authority to intervene, the Court has also affirmed a
" Id. at 460.
38 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
39 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); see generally Barbara Ann Leavine, Court-
ordered Cesareans: Can a Pregnant Woman Refuse?, 29 Hous. L. REv. 185 (1992)
(discussing court ordered c-section cases' reliance on balancing interests).
40 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
41 Id. at 163.
42 Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (rejecting Roe's trimester framework as being too
rigid).
41 Id. at 870.
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woman's right to put her own health before that of her fetus. 44 In
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
the Court struck down portions of an abortion law that required physi-
cians who were performing a post-viability abortion to use a technique
that improved the chances that the fetus would survive and put the
mother at higher risk.45 This case suggests that the mother does have
rights that are superior to that of the fetus and that the state's interests
are somewhat limited in their ability to protect the fetus over the inter-
ests of the mother. While states generally find their interests in the
abortion cases, it is unclear how these cases would apply in a situation
in which the mother has refused a c-section.
E. Fetal Rights
Courts have issued various statements regarding the rights of the
fetus. For example, courts have ruled that children have the right to
be born with a healthy mind and body.46 Courts have also determined
that the fetus has the right to be protected by the court in refusal of c-
section cases 47 and maternal drug use cases. 48 The court ultimately
upheld the conviction of a mother for endangering her baby through
pre-birth cocaine use. While the Whither court determined that the
term "child," as used in the statute, includes a viable fetus, 49 other
courts have held that the legislature did not intend for the term "child"
to refer to a fetus. 50 Although some of the cases regarding forced c-
sections have discussed the rights of the fetus, these rights are rela-
44 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747.
45 Id. at 768-69 (agreeing with the appellate court that the statute was "un-
constitutional because it required a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and fetal
survival, and failed to require that maternal health be the physician's paramount con-
sideration.").
46 E.g., Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 398 (D.C.
1987) (recognizing "the right of a viable fetus to be free of tortious injury"); Jarvis v.
Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236, 238-39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); In re Ruiz, 500
N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1986) (holding that a child has the right to begin life
with a sound mind and body); Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971)
(allowing a negligence action brought on behalf of a child).
4 E.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460
(Ga. 1981).
48 Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
49 Id. at 778. See Regina M. Coady, Comment, Extending ChildAbuse Pro-
tection to the Viable Fetus: Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 71 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
667 (1997) (discussing courts that have and have not extended protection to fetuses).
50 In re Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (ruling that an
unborn fetus is not a person for the purpose of determining dependency); In re Dit-
trick Infant, 263 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. 1977); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr.
912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
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tively new and the law has not always granted rights to the fetus. The
next section is a brief review of the development of fetal rights.
II. EVOLUTION OF FETAL RIGHTS
The criminalization of the refusal to undergo a c-section is the lat-
est development in a growing trend of granting rights to a fetus. At
common law, a fetus was not a "person" that was entitled to be pro-
tected by the law; it was seen simply as an extension of the mother
until birth.5 Inheritance law was the first area to grant a fetus rights.
The court in Cowles v. Cowles held that an individual can will prop-
erty to a fetus who is conceived before his/her death and later is born
alive.52
In 1946, a fetus was granted rights in tort law when the District
Court of the United States for the District of Columbia determined
that a child could recover for pre-birth injuries.53 Even after courts
began to give the fetus rights to recover in tort, they resisted making
mothers and fetuses adversaries, by denying the fetus the right to sue
the mother for pre-birth behavior.
54
Under most criminal law statutes, a fetus was traditionally not
considered a "person. 55  The fetus gained significant rights under
criminal law in 1984, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that a fetus was a "person" and was entitled to protection under
the state's criminal homicide statute.56 However, states were slow to
extend criminal prosecutions to maternal acts. While third parties
could be prosecuted for harming a fetus, mothers could not. In State
v. Ashley, a pregnant teenager shot herself in the abdomen, intending
51 For a more detailed account of the evolution of fetal rights, see Coady,
supra note 49; Cook, supra note 15, at 1318-19.
52 13 A. 414 (Conn. 1887); see also Christian v. Carter, 137 S.E. 596 (N.C.
1927) (upholding the lower court's ruling that a child conceived before decedent's
death, but born after decedent's death was entitled to recover under intestancy).
53 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946) (ruling that the child had
standing to sue a physician for injuries sustained while a viable fetus in the womb).
54 Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (ruling that no cause
of action exists for a fetus to sue his/her mother for unintentional infliction of prenatal
injuries that arose out of an automobile accident). But see Grodin v. Grodin, 301
N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (court held that the mother does not have
immunitz from parent-child tort actions if she acted unreasonably).
In re Dittrick Infant, 263 N.W.2d 37 (concluding the legislature did not
intend for the statute to be applied to a fetus).
56 Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (Mass. 1984). See also
State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984) (ruling that the murderer of a viable fetus
can be prosecuted for homicide, but reversing the conviction in the case at hand be-
cause such prosecution was unprecedented at the time the event occurred).
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to harm the child.57 The child was delivered by c-section but later
died due to complications related to being premature. Ms. Ashley was
charged with manslaughter and third degree felony murder; however
the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the mother was immune
from criminal prosecution for harming her fetus.5 8
While the Ashley case represented an extreme case, prosecutors
were also interested in penalizing mothers for causing more common
injuries to their fetuses. For years, prosecutors argued in vain that the
transmittal of drugs from mother to child through the umbilical cord
should be covered in criminal statutes,59 or that the fetus was a "child"
that was protected by statute.60 Finally, in 1997 the South Carolina
Supreme Court found that the word "child" in the child abuse statute
applied to a viable fetus.6 ' Ultimately, the court upheld a conviction
of a woman who admitted to using drugs during pregnancy, 62 paving
the way for prosecutions of mothers for their behavior during preg-
nancy.
A. Criminal Charges Against Mothers
Women have been charged for a variety of behaviors during preg-
nancy, including use of illegal drugs, use of alcohol, and failure to
follow a doctor's orders.63 The charges have included child abuse or
neglect, distribution of illegal substances to a minor, and homicide.
64
57701 So. 2d at 339.
58 Id. at 339.
59 E.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992).
60 E.g., Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (concluding
that drug use during pregnancy does not constitute criminal child abuse); State v.
Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a parent cannot be prosecuted for
child endangerment as a result of substance abuse during pregnancy); Reyes v. Supe-
rior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
61 Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997).
62 Id.
63 See Jean Reith Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health
Oriented Responses to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETmcs 217 (2001) (discussing the various responses to prenatal drug use); Whitner,
492 S.E.2d at 779; People v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. (San Diego Mun. Ct.
Feb 26, 1987) reported in Cook, supra note 15, at 1309 n.23, and James Drago, Note,
One for My Baby, One More for the Road: Legislation and Counseling to Prevent
Prenatal Exposure to Alcohol, 7 CARDozo WOMEN's L.J. 163, 173-74 (2001).
64 See generally In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(explaining why juvenile courts should have jurisdiction over child born addicted to
drugs); In re Ruiz 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986); Johnson, 602 So.
2d at 1290, 1297 (reversing the conviction of a mother who used drugs within twenty-
four hours of giving birth).
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The pre-birth use of illegal drugs is considered child abuse in
many jurisdictions65 and has been written into many child abuse or
neglect statutes.66 Even before courts were willing to press criminal
charges against mothers for illegal drug use during pregnancy, they
were willing to terminate the parent's rights to the child when there
was evidence of pre-birth drug use. For example, in In re Troy D., the
court determined that the mother's drug abuse constituted child
67
abuse. Similarly, the court in In re Ruiz determined that a child who
was born addicted to heroin was covered under the child abuse statute
and that pre-birth drug use constituted child abuse.68 In contrast, the
court in In re Valerie D. determined that drug use during pregnancy
was not grounds for terminating a woman's parental rights because
the statute was not intended to apply to a fetus.69
Prosecutors were slower to press criminal charges for pre-birth
drug use. In a typical case, Reyes v. Superior Court, a woman gave
birth to heroin-addicted twins and was charged with two felony counts
of child endangerment.70 The court determined that the legislature did
not intend the statute to include the abuse of a fetus. Some jurisdic-
tions have also sought convictions of women for delivering controlled
substances to a minor.71 In Johnson v. State, a woman admitted to
using drugs during her pregnancy and was prosecuted for delivering a
controlled substance to a minor in the time between birth and when
the umbilical cord was severed. The Supreme Court of Florida later
overturned the conviction, deciding that the legislature did not intend
for the statute to be used in such situations.72 It was not until 1997, in
Whitner v. State, that a court became willing to extend a statute to
provide protection for a fetus harmed by drug abuse.73
Criminal prosecutions based on the consumption of alcohol dur-
ing pregnancy are even more controversial because the use of alcohol
is legal, though some courts have not distinguished the use of alcohol
from the use of other illegal drugs. For instance, a New York court
found that "[p]roof that a person repeatedly misuses a drug or drugs or
alcoholic beverages ... shall be prima facie evidence that a child...
is a neglected child.",74 Similarly, the Whitner court stated that the
65 E.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. at 872; In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 935.
66 See Schroedel, supra note 63.
67 In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
68 In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 935.
69 613 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992).
70 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
71 E.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992).
72 id.
73 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
74 In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Monroe County Fam. Ct. 1985).
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legality of the substance does not reduce the harm done to the state's
interest. 75 Thus, it is likely that the Whitner court would have con-
victed Ms. Whitner even if she had abused alcohol rather than co-
caine.
The Whitner decision represents a step towards criminal prosecu-
tion of mothers for their pre-birth behavior. Whether this step is a
sufficient bridge towards the criminalization of c-section refusal is a
question yet to be answered. The next section discusses the issue and
determines that c-section refusal will likely not be a prosecutable of-
fense in most jurisdictions, at least not under current case law and
statutory schemes. Since other states have yet to follow the Whitner
decision, and no state has successfully prosecuted a woman for failing
to follow her doctor's orders, it is unlikely that many states are willing
to take the leap that the Utah prosecutor has suggested. Further, there
are a variety of reasons why states should refrain from prosecuting
women for refusing a c-section. Section III presents a detailed analy-
sis of these issues.
III. ANALYSIS
The future of prosecuting women for their failure to have a c-
section is uncertain but near. The Melissa Rowland case indicates an
increasing willingness to penalize women for their prenatal decisions.
This article has reviewed the case law regarding court-ordered c-
sections and the criminalization of prenatal drug use. The review re-
vealed that some states are willing to compel a woman to have a c-
section against her wishes, and some are willing to prosecute mothers
for pre-birth drug use. These cases lay the groundwork needed for an
analysis of the prosecution for refusal to undergo a c-section. Two
questions remain unanswered: (1) Under the current case law, will a
state be successful in prosecuting a woman for the failure to have a c-
section?; and (2) Should the state prosecute women for failure to have
a c-section?
A. Will a Prosecution Be Successful?
There are a number of obstacles standing in the way of a prosecu-
tion for failure to have a c-section. The first is related to the issue of
court-ordered c-sections. If the jurisdiction has indicated that a
woman cannot be forced to undergo an unwanted c-section, then the
state cannot logically prosecute her criminally for refusing to do so.
Some states faced with the issue of forced c-sections have found in
" Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 781-82.
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favor of the mother's right to refuse treatment,76 and would likely
favor the mother in striking down a criminal conviction as well.
The second obstacle is related to the issues of statutory interpreta-
tion. Because there are currently no statutes directly addressing the
issue of refused c-sections, a prosecution would have to rely on stat-
utes similar to those that have been used to prosecute women for pre-
birth drug abuse, such as child endangerment or neglect statutes.
When prosecutors have attempted to use such statutes to prosecute
mothers who used drugs, they often failed because the court ulti-
mately found that the legislature did not intend the statute to be used
in that way. For example, in the Reyes v. Superior Court case dis-
cussed above, the court determined that the child endangerment stat-
ute was not intended to protect a fetus. 77 It is not likely that such a
prosecution would be effective in states that have refused to find that
the applicable statutes (e.g. child abuse) apply to a fetus. 78 Such a
prosecution is more likely in a state, such as South Carolina, which
has given the fetus rights and allowed a mother to be prosecuted for
child neglect for exposing her fetus to drugs.79
Another question of statutory interpretation was dealt with by the
Johnson court, discussed above, which determined that the statute
prohibiting delivery of a controlled substance to a minor was not in-
tended to cover the transfer of drugs through the umbilical cord.80
Similarly, the court in People v. Stewart held that a neglect statute was
not intended for use in criminal prosecutions, and therefore a woman
could not be charged with fetal neglect for failing to adhere to her
doctor's orders, such as maintaining bed rest and avoiding sex with
her husband. 8' In these cases, prosecutors attempted to stretch exist-
ing laws in order to prosecute a woman for her prenatal behavior. A
similar stretch would be necessary to prosecute a woman for failing to
have a c-section. Based on the courts' reactions in cases such as
Johnson and Stewart, most courts are likely to hold that the legislature
did not intend for child endangerment or other such laws to apply to
the refusal to have a c-section.
76 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632
N.E.2d 326, 332 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
77 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); see also In re Valarie D., 613
A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992) (ruling that a mother's parental rights could not be terminated
due to cocaine use during pregnancy).
78 E.g, Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912; In re Valarie D., 613 A.2d at 748.
79 Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786.
8o Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992).
81 People v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb 26,
1987) reported in Cook, supra note 15, at 1309 n.23 and Drago, supra note 63, at
173-74.
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Finally, states that adhere to the parental immunity rule would
necessarily be barred from seeking such a prosecution. In the Ashley
case discussed above, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
the mother was immune from criminal prosecution for attempting to
harm her fetus by shooting herself in the abdomen.82 A state that rec-
ognized this maternal immunity would likely be unwilling to support
a prosecution for refusal of a c-section.
In sum, the case law of most states would not support the prosecu-
tion of women for failure to have a c-section. Beyond the question of
whether a state can prosecute a woman for refusal to have a c-section
is the question of whether a woman should be prosecuted. The next
section poses several reasons that the answer to this question should
be "no."
B. The State Should Not Prosecute Women for Refusing a C-Section
There are many reasons a state should refrain from the criminal
prosecution of women for their refusal to have a c-section. First, such
a prosecution stands to violate many of the mother's rights, such as
the right to privacy, the right to refuse medical treatment, the right to
free exercise of religion, the due process right of notice, and the right
to equal protection. This analysis will focus on the first two. 83 A
woman's right to privacy and the right to refuse medical treatment are
essential, fundamental rights that are guaranteed to every American.
Although becoming pregnant presents a difficult dilemma, these rights
should not be subordinated by the presence of a fetus.
Courts have refused to compel an individual to undergo intrusive
medical procedures in order to benefit another person.84 In McFall v.
Shimp, the court declined to compel Mr. Shimp to donate bone mar-
row which would have saved his cousin's life, stating,
"[f]or our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion
of his body would change every concept and principle upon
which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the
sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which
82 State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 1997).
83 Although the other rights are very important rights, they are beyond the
scope of the current paper.
84 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (stating that patient
consent is required before a surgeon can perform an operation for the benefit of an-
other patient); McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa.D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny Cty. Corn. Pl. 1978)
(denying request for an injunction that would compel defendant to donate bone mar-
row).
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would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the
line would be drawn.,
85
Thus, it is illogical to force a woman to have a c-section against
her will when courts have determined that an individual cannot be
forced to undergo intrusive medical procedures to aid others. An ar-
gument can be made that, when a woman becomes pregnant, she as-
sumes an enhanced duty towards the fetus. The A.C. court rejected
this notion, stating, "a fetus cannot have rights in this respect superior
to those of a person who has already been born. 86
Like many of the previous c-section cases, a challenge to the pro-
posed prosecution would likely rely heavily on the abortion case law.
The Thornburgh Court offered the strongest support for the notion
that the mother should not be forced to undergo a risky medical pro-
cedure for the sake of the fetus. In Thornburgh, the Supreme Court
considered an abortion law that required doctors to perform a certain
type of post-viability abortion because it increased the chance that the
fetus would survive.8 7 The Court struck down the statute because it
created an unacceptable risk to the mother in order to protect the fe-
tus. 88 Likewise, the state should not be allowed to force a c-section
for the sake of the fetus because, in most cases, a c-section creates an
increased risk (as compared to natural birth) for the mother. Although
a few states have shown a willingness to force a woman to have a c-
section, 89 courts should re-think these decisions and refuse to infringe
upon women's rights to privacy and rights to refuse medical treat-
ment.
The second reason that states should not prosecute women for re-
fusing a c-section is because her refusal differs dramatically from
other behaviors that women have previously been prosecuted for,
namely, drug use. The differences between the two acts are signifi-
cant and suggest that laws allowing women to be prosecuted for pre-
birth drug use should not be stretched to cover refusal to undergo a c-
section.
" 10 Pa.D. & C.3d at 91.
86 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990). See also Katherine A.
Knopoff, Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79 CAL. L. REV.
499 (1991) (discussing duties owed to fetus and others); Blair D. Condoll, Comment,
Extending Constitutional Protection to the Viable Fetus: A Woman's Right to Pri-
vacy, 22 S.U. L. REV. 149 (1994) (discussing woman's duties to a fetus).
87 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
88 Id. at 768-69 (discussing Appeals Court ruling).
89 Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga.
1981); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251
(N.D. Fla. 1999).
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The major difference between drug use and refusal of a c-section
is that women do not have a fundamental right to use drugs, whereas a
woman does have fundamental rights to privacy, and a fundamental
right to refuse medical treatment. Thus, the leap that would be re-
quired to find that these statutes pertain to the refusal of a c-section is
significant and should be prevented. Prosecuting a woman for using
illegal drugs during pregnancy is substantially different from prose-
cuting a woman for exercising her right to refuse medical treatment.
Another reason women should not be prosecuted for failing to
take a doctor's advice is because the charges would rest on the accu-
racy of medical predictions. Although doctors are trained profession-
als, they do make mistakes in their predictions. Doctors seek court
orders to force c-sections because they feel it is in the best interest of
the fetus and/or the mother. Trial courts often defer to the opinion of
doctors; however doctors have, in many instances, been incorrect. 9°
Even in the Rowland case, one of the twins was born healthy, even
though the medical personnel predicted that both twins would likely
suffer harm or death if the mother did not have an emergency c-
section. 91 Although a fifty percent survival rate is not optimal, it
demonstrates that doctors are not always accurate in their predictions.
Similarly, in the cases of Jefferson92 and In re Baby Boy Doe,93 the
women delivered healthy babies through natural childbirth after being
told that they needed to undergo c-sections. If these women had been
prosecuted for their refusal to undergo the c-section, the case would
rest on the fact that they had refused a procedure that turned out to be
unnecessary.
The criminalization of the refusal to have a c-section would al-
most certainly increase the number of c-sections performed, even if
only marginally, which would then increase the number of women
who are put at risk by unnecessary surgery. Critics suggest that many,
if not most, c-sections are unnecessary and represent an unacceptable
risk to the mothers.94 That is not to say that c-sections are not appro-
priate in some cases to save the life of the fetus or the mother; how-
ever it does indicate that judges, policy makers, and prosecutors
90 See Cherry, supra note 32, at 564-65; Charity Scott, Resisting the Tempta-
tion to Turn Medical Recommendations into Judicial Orders: A Reconsideration of
Court-Ordered Surgery for Pregnant Women, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 615, 660-65
(1994) (arguing that doctors are frequently wrong in their assessment of the need for
c-sections).
91 See generally WASH. TIMES, supra note 1; Sage, supra note 1; Santini,
supra note 1.
92 274 S.E.2d 457 (baby was born healthy). See Scott, supra note 90, at 660.
9' 632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Il. App. Ct. 1994).
94 Scott, supra note 90, at 661.
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should be cautious about putting too much faith in the doctor's predic-
tions. Because the accuracy of a doctor's advice cannot be guaran-
teed, women should not be treated as criminals for their choice to ex-
ercise their rights to refuse treatment instead of taking the doctor's
advice.
There are also many ethical, policy and economic reasons not to
prosecute women for failing to have c-sections. First, mothers, espe-
cially those who practice religions that forbid c-sections, could avoid
seeking pre-natal care in order to avoid prosecution. Making doctors
responsible for reporting refusals is a breach of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. If the state is truly interested in protecting a fetus, it should
refrain from supporting laws that make it likely that some mothers
will avoid prenatal care that would benefit the fetus.
Similarly, prosecution resulting in incarceration would not be
healthy for a surviving baby or the other family members.95 Sending
the mother to jail would encourage separation of families, as the state
may seek termination of parental rights of a surviving child. Further,
incarceration is expensive and would place extra burdens on many
states that are already dealing with overcrowded jails.
Finally, women should not be prosecuted because such charges
could create a slippery slope of criminal prosecutions of women for
their behavior during pregnancy. As discussed above, a fetus did not
have extensive rights at common law, but piece by piece, courts have
granted the unborn fetus rights in property, torts, and criminal law.
Eventually, this trend led to the prosecution of mothers for their be-
havior during pregnancy. Some courts have directly controlled preg-
nant women's actions through court orders to have c-sections. Courts
have also controlled women's behavior indirectly through child abuse
guidelines and criminal sanctions for misbehavior during pregnancy.
The criminal prosecution of women who refuse c-sections repre-
sents the next step in this trend. The list of behaviors that present
some level of risk to the fetus is seemingly endless. Thus, once we
use the criminal law to force a woman to have major surgery, what's
to stop courts from criminalizing smoking, using prescription drugs,
engaging in sexual activity, playing sports, soaking in a hot tubs or
changing the cat's litter box during pregnancy? Should the courts also
force women to follow nutritional advice, comply with bed-rest or-
ders, or have medical tests?
If it is illegal to cause harm to a fetus by using drugs or refusing to
have a c-section, should it also be illegal to conceive a fetus when the
95 See Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 63, at 220 (stating that "incarceration
actually works against the goals of improving fetal health).
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mother knows that, because of her condition, she may cause it harm?
For example, should it be a crime for women with HIV to have a
baby? How about women with inheritable diseases or defects? How
about older women who are at greater risk of having an unhealthy
baby? The very action of becoming pregnant creates a risk to babies
in these situations, as they may inherit a harmful genetic disease or
contract a deadly virus during development. Should we take away
some women's rights to have children because society does not want
the burden of caring for unhealthy children, or because society wants
to punish mothers for their unacceptable behaviors?
At what point do we stop this slope from becoming too slippery?
One could say that if a preventable harm is almost certain to occur, it
should be criminalized. However, it is hard to determine whether a
fetus will be harmed by any particular behavior, since not all babies
exposed to alcohol or illegal drugs are actually harmed, and not all
babies are harmed if they are not delivered through c-section. Harm
from other proscriptions (e.g., bed rest, nutritional advice) is possibly
even harder to predict. Further, it is impossible to tell whether the
harm would have happened even if the woman had followed the ad-
vice. For example a woman ordered to bed rest may still have com-
plications that harm the baby, even if she did comply with the doctor's
orders. Thus, it is illogical to charge her with failing to follow the
orders.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some states have demonstrated that they are willing to force
women to undergo c-sections, and some are willing to prosecute
women for prenatal drug use. Utah is the first state to press charges
against a woman who refused a c-section, indicating a willingness to
take this trend of fetal protection even further. Making the leap be-
tween court-ordered c-sections and criminalizing the failure to have a
c-section is a huge step that the courts should be unwilling to make.
Similarly, the courts should refuse to make the giant leap from prose-
cuting women for pre-birth drug use to refusal of a c-section.
Although the refusal to undergo a c-section that could save the life
of a fetus may seem like a barbarian act, there may be legitimate rea-
sons why a woman may choose to do so. Therefore, courts and prose-
cutors should be careful not to confuse moral obligations with legal
obligations. While it seems like having a c-section is morally the
right thing to do, making it a crime to refuse a c-section jeopardizes a
woman's rights, and subjects her to an increased risk of injury as a
result of a surgery that may have been unnecessary.
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